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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
("DTPA") 1 was enacted in 1973 "to protect consumers against
false, misleading and deceptive business practices, unconscionable
actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection."'2 The most recent amendments,
enacted in 1995 by the 74th Texas Legislature, govern all causes of action
accruing on or after September 1, 1995, and all causes of action, regard-
less of when they accrued, filed on or after September 1, 1996. In enact-
ing the 1995 amendments, the legislature introduced new restrictions on
the DTPA's applicability to nonresidential transactions involving large
dollar amounts and to professional services. Years after the amendments
were enacted, the courts have begun to address these changes to the stat-
ute's coverage for professional services. However, five years after the
amendments, there still are no reported cases discussing the exclusion of
nonresidential transactions involving substantial dollar amounts
($100,000 in cases involving a written contract, and $500,000 in all such
cases irrespective of the existence of a contract) 3 from the statute's
coverage.
This Survey covers significant developments under the DTPA from Oc-
tober 1, 1999 through September 30, 2000. Noteworthy decisions during
the Survey period address consumer status and defenses to DTPA claims.
II. CONSUMER STATUS
Several of the more interesting decisions during the Survey period in-
volved the requirement that the plaintiff be a "consumer" as that term is
defined in the statute. 4 To qualify as a consumer, the plaintiff must be an
individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, goods or services
that form the basis of the plaintiff's complaint.5 Whether a plaintiff quali-
fies for DTPA consumer status is a question of law.
6
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 2001) [here-
inafter DTPA].
2. Id. § 17.44(a).
3. Id. § 17.49(f), (g).
4. See id. § 17.50.
5. Id. § 17.45(4); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex.
1987).
6. Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust, 855 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
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A. THE PLAINTIFF'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE TRANSACTION
Consumer status under the DTPA depends upon a showing that the
plaintiff's relationship to the transaction entitles it to relief.7 Banzhaf v.
ADT Security Syst. Southwest, Inc.8 arose from an armed robbery of the
Herman's Sporting Goods store in Richardson, Texas. During that rob-
bery, which allegedly was committed by an employee and his accomplice,
one employee was killed and another was seriously injured. The injured
employee and the parents of the murdered employee brought suit against
ADT, which had provided Herman's security system, alleging negligence,
design defect and DTPA violations. ADT then filed a third-party claim
against Herman's seeking contractual indemnification. The trial court
granted ADT's motion for summary judgment. 9
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the injured employee was a con-
sumer and that ADT did not address the claim of the other employee's
parents in its summary judgment motion. The Eastland Court of Appeals
reversed as to the parents' claim, agreeing that ADT inexplicably failed
to address that claim in its motion. 10 The court of appeals affirmed sum-
mary judgment in favor of ADT on the employee's claim. 1 The court
recognized that when an employer purchases good or services for the
benefit of an employee, that employee "acquires" the goods and services
and thus is a consumer for DTPA purposes. 12 However, the particular
security system selected by Herman's was designed only to protect Her-
man's premises and merchandise after the store closed and when no em-
ployees were present. Since the system was not for the benefit of
Herman's employees, the employee was not a consumer.' 3
The San Antonio Court of Appeals also considered when a third-party
beneficiary has consumer status in Lukasik v. San Antonio Blue Haven
Pools, Inc. 14 Margaret Lukasik contracted with Blue Haven Pools to con-
struct a swimming pool in her backyard. During the construction, Mar-
garet contacted Blue Haven regarding acquisition of a pool alarm and
was informed that Blue Haven did not sell such alarms. Blue Haven at-
tempted to locate an alarm for the pool but was unable to do so. After
the pool was completed, Kenneth and Christina Lukasik and their young
children moved into a garage apartment behind Margaret's house. One
of the children fell into the pool and drowned. The Lukasiks filed suit
alleging that Blue Haven's failure to provide a pool alarm and misrepre-
7. Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. 1996); see also
Sanchez v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a "DTPA
claim requires an underlying consumer transaction; there must be a nexus between the
consumer, the transaction, and the defendant's conduct") (citing Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at
650).
8. 28 S.W.3d 180 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied).
9. Id. at 183.




14. 21 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
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sentation regarding its ability to procure one constituted negligence, gross
negligence and violations of the DTPA. Kenneth and Christina Lukasik
also asserted a cause of action for wrongful death, and Christina and Mar-
garet brought a bystander claim. Blue Haven filed a motion for summary
judgment, which the trial court granted. 15
The court of appeals affirmed. As to the DTPA claims by Kenneth and
Christina Lukasik as individuals, the court held that the summary judg-
ment evidence established that they never sought to acquire the pool
alarm and that any transaction to acquire a pool alarm was not specifi-
cally required by, or intended to benefit them.' 6 The court further held
that Kenneth and Christina lacked DTPA standing as representatives of
their child's estate because any cause of action the child could have pur-
sued did not survive his death.17 Finally, the court held that Margaret
lacked consumer status because the undisputed summary judgment evi-
dence showed that Blue Haven did not sell pool alarms and that the par-
ties did not enter into any agreement or understanding as to a price of an
alarm, how it would be purchased or paid for, or whether Margaret would
pay Blue Haven or the supplier. Thus, Margaret failed to establish that
she had a good faith intent and the capacity to purchase a pool alarm, let
alone the necessary agreement to do so.18 Because the summary judg-
ment evidence established that the plaintiffs were not consumers under
the DTPA, the court affirmed the summary judgment on that cause of
action.19
A potential buyer of surplus paint sued the potential seller in Malone v.
E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 20 The buyer sent a letter to the seller
stating that he was "interested" in buying surplus paint for $3 a gallon for
sale in Lebanon. The buyer claimed that after he made several such
purchases from the seller, each of which was made under a standard in-
voice form, the seller told him that the paint could not be shipped into
Lebanon. Shortly thereafter, however, the seller sold the paint to some-
one else who sold it into Lebanon. The buyer and his middleman sued
the seller for breach of contract, fraud, tortious interference with contract
and DTPA violations alleging that the seller had agreed to sell him all of
its surplus paint. The buyer and middleman later amended their petition
to raise claims that some of the paint was defective and that the seller had
committed "fraud in business." After the amendment, the plaintiffs'
DTPA claims were based upon the complaints that the paint was defec-
tive and that the seller did not sell as much paint as it agreed to sell.
15. Id. at 398.
16. Id. at 401-02.
17. Id. at 402.
18. Id. (citing Martin v. Lou Poliquin Ent., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 180, 184-85 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The court also held that Margaret's purchase
of the pool from Blue Haven did not establish consumer status because Margaret did not
assert a DTPA claim with regard to the pool purchase. Id. at 403.
19. Id. at 403.
20. 8 S.W.3d 710 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
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The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller and the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed.2 1 As to the DTPA claim regard-
ing the amount of paint sold, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs
were not consumers because the goods sold-the paint-did not form the
basis of the complaint. 22 The court held that "a DTPA plaintiff whose
claim is not based on any fault in the goods, but merely complains of the
seller's failure to sell as much as the plaintiff wanted to buy, is not a
consumer."
23
B. DOES THE TRANSACTION INVOLVE GOODS OR SERVICES?
An additional statutory issue when determining consumer status is
whether the plaintiff sought or acquired "any goods or services .... -24
During the Survey period several cases turned on this issue.
The plaintiffs in Baily v. Gulf States Utils. Co. 25 filed a suit for injunc-
tive relief contending that Gulf States Utilities threatened to disconnect
their electricity for non-payment of a disputed bill. They subsequently
amended their petition to add Gulf States' successor-in-interest, Entergy
Corporation, as a defendant and to seek damages for mental anguish aris-
ing from DTPA violations, oppressive conduct, negligence, intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress and breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing with respect to the DTPA claims that electricity was
not the basis of the plaintiffs' claims and that electricity is neither a good
nor a service. The trial court granted the motion.2 6
The Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the plaintiffs'
DTPA claims.27 The court held that "[t]he means of making a consumer
purchase is a transaction, so that deceptive practices in financing the
transaction are actionable under the DTPA. '' 28 Because the deceptive
practice allegedly arose directly from a transaction in which the plaintiffs
purchased electricity, the only question remaining was whether electricity
is a good. The court answered this question in the affirmative, 29 noting
that the Texas Supreme Court has held that electricity is a "product" for
purposes of products liability.30 Because the plaintiffs were consumers of
electric power, they were entitled to consumer status.31
21. Id. at 715-16.
22. Id. at 715.
23. Id.
24. DTPA § 17.45.
25. 27 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied).
26. Id. at 715.
27. Id. at 719.
28. Id. at 718.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.
1988)).
31. Id.; see also Boales v. Brighton Builders, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 159, 169 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (holding that home buyers contending that devel-
oper and builder made misrepresentations to induce them to buy their homes were con-
2001] D TPA 1273
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Money, on the other hand, is not a good or service, and a person who
seeks only to borrow money therefore is not a DTPA consumer.32 When
the extension of credit is incident to the sale of goods or services and the
conduct of the creditor is intertwined in the sale, however, the borrower
may be a consumer with respect to the creditor as well as the seller of the
goods or services. 33 The Waco Court of Appeals examined this concept
in Burleson State Bank v. Plunkett,34 in which a bank was sued for com-
mon law and statutory fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrep-
resentation and DTPA violations in connection with a construction loan
transaction. The trial court denied the bank's motion for summary judg-
ment on the DTPA claim, which had argued that the plaintiff was not a
consumer.35 Reversing, the Waco Court of Appeals held that the plain-
tiff's goal in his interaction with the bank was to assist homeowners with
obtaining a construction loan and that the only thing sought by purchase
or lease was the loan of money.36 The court further held that the bank's
ancillary services served no purpose other than facilitating the construc-
tion loan and thus were not an independent objective of the transaction.37
III. DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
In addition to establishing consumer status, a DTPA plaintiff also must
show that a "false, misleading, or deceptive act," breach of warranty or
unconscionable action or course of action occurred, and that such con-
duct was the producing cause of the plaintiff's damage. 38
A. LAUNDRY LIST CLAIMS
DTPA section 17.46(b) contains, in 25 subparts, a nonexclusive list of
actions that constitute "false, misleading or deceptive acts" under the
statute.39 Plaintiffs invoking these "laundry list ' '40 claims are generally
not required to prove or plead the defendant's state of mind or intent to
deceive,41 nor have plaintiffs always been required to show that they re-
lied on the enumerated deceptions. 42 Whether a consumer should have
sumers because they were complaining about an aspect of the real estate and the
transaction involved).
32. Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174-75 (Tex. 1980).
33. Brown v. Bank of Galveston, 930 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1996), affd, 963 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1998).
34. 27 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied).
35. Id. at 614-15.
36. Id. at 615.
37. Id.
38. DTPA § 17.50(a)(1)-(3).
39. Id. § 17.46(b)(1)-(25).
40. The earliest located reported reference to the enumerated items listed under
DTPA section 17.46(b) as a "laundry list" occurred in Mobile County Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Jewell, 555 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980). Several subsections ex-
plicitly involve an element of scienter. See, e.g., DTPA § 17.46(b)(9), (10), (13), (16), (17)
& (23).
42. Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985).
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to show reliance, however, remains the subject of debate.43 Several sig-
nificant cases involving "laundry list" claims were decided during the Sur-
vey period.
The death of a goat named Pancho gave rise to the case of Hight v.
Dublin Veterinary Clinic.44 The goat's owners placed Pancho with a
breeding facility "for the purpose of standing him at stud, collecting, stor-
ing and selling his semen."'45 An employee of the breeding facility noti-
fied the owners that Pancho's horns were growing into his head. The
owners consented to a "tipping" of Pancho's horns. Pancho was anesthe-
tized at a veterinary clinic and dehorned but 15 to 20 minutes after the
procedure was completed, Pancho died. His body was burned without his
owners' consent.
Pancho's owners sued the breeding facility, the veterinary clinic and
the veterinarian for negligence, breach of contract, breach of warranty
and DTPA violations. 46 Regarding the DTPA claims against the breeding
facility, the owners asserted that the facility's owners "represented them-
selves as a reputable and established service company which was capable
of caring for Pancho and standing him at stud ... and providing reproduc-
tive services."'47 They then argued that, since Pancho died in the care of
the breeding facility, it was not capable of caring for Pancho as it had
represented and had taken an unconscionable course of action.48
The trial court granted summary judgment on the DTPA claims, and
the Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed. 49 The court held that Pancho's
owners had offered no evidence that the breeding facility was incompe-
tent in providing genetic services or routine boarding and care and no
evidence of any misrepresentations that encompassed the performance of
veterinary care, surgical treatment or postoperative treatment.50
The San Antonio Court of Appeals considered the amount of evidence
of a misrepresentation necessary to survive a "no evidence" summary
judgment in Gonzalez v. Temple-Inland Mortgage Corp.51 The
Gonzalezes were notified in December of 1995 that their home mortgage
was "severely past due." On January 18, 1996, the Gonzalezes received a
notice of acceleration. The notice stated that the amount necessary to
cure the default was $5,868.06 and that if the default was not cured within
20 days, the bank would accelerate the maturity date of the note and have
the house sold at a foreclosure sale. The Gonzalezes responded to the
notice of acceleration by asserting that the $5,868.06 was incorrect and
that they only owed $3,670.53. They stated their intention to pay that
43. See generally Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs. Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.
1995).
44. 22 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied).
45. Id. at 617.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 624.
48. Id.
49. Gonzalez, 22 S.W.3d at 617.
50. Id. at 624.
51. 28 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
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amount within the week and requested a correct summary of the pay-
ments owed. Instead, they received a notice of acceleration and foreclo-
sure. The Gonzalezes paid the $5,868.06 under protest and filed suit
against the bank and the mortgage company and one of its employees
asserting various causes of action including unreasonable and negligent
debt collection practices, duress and DTPA violations. The trial court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, which had argued
that there was no evidence that they had misrepresented the amount of
the debt due, and the Gonzalezes appealed.52 The court of appeals re-
versed. The court found that the notice of foreclosure stated that as of
January 1996, the amount necessary to cure the default was $5,868.06 but
that the mortgage company admitted in its interrogatory responses that a
portion of that amount was applied to the payments due in February and
March 1996 and that $430.30 was held in "suspense. ' '53 The court held
that this evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the defendants had misrepresented the amount of debt due.5 4
In Maclntire v. Armed Forces Benefit Ass'n,55 an insurance policy
lapsed for failure to make premium payments before the insured died.
The beneficiary nevertheless sought payment of the benefits and sued the
insurer when it denied her request. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the insurer and the beneficiary appealed, arguing that genu-
ine issues of material fact existed as to each of her claims.56 The San
Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed. As to the beneficiary's DTPA
claims, the court held that "an insurer who proves it had a reasonable
basis for denying a claim, even if the finder eventually determines that
basis to be erroneous, enjoys immunity from statutory bad faith under the
Texas Insurance Code and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act."'57
The court also held that the mere breach of an insurance contract does
not give rise to an Insurance Code or DTPA claim.58 Because the benefi-
ciary did not offer evidence of damages beyond the denial of benefits, as
a matter of law the insured could not be liable and was entitled to sum-
mary judgment. 59
The defendants in Helena Chemical Co. v. Wilkins60 argued that their
statements to farmers regarding the quality of their sorghum seed
amounted to nonactionable puffing. On appeal from a judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the knowl-
edge possessed by the buyer and seller is important in determining
whether statements amount to puffing. The question is whether the seller
is asserting a fact of which the buyer is ignorant or merely stating an
52. Id. at 624-25.
53. Id. at 625.
54. Id.
55. 27 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
56. Id. at 87-88.
57. Id. at 92.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 92-93.
60. 18 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000), affd, 47 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. 2001).
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opinion or judgment on a matter on which the seller has no special
knowledge and on which the buyer also is expected to have an opinion. 61
The court found that the defendants made written representations that
the particular seed was better than the other seed brands that they sold
and that they had special knowledge stemming from the seeds' perform-
ance in prior tests. Thus, the defendants' statements were actionable and
judgment on the jury's verdict for the plaintiffs was affirmed. 62
1. § 17.46(b)(12)-Misrepresentation of Rights,
Remedies or Obligations
To maintain an action for misrepresentation under DTPA section
17.46(b)(12), a consumer must show that the defendant represented "that
an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it
does not have or involve. '63 Plaintiffs seeking to convert a breach of con-
tract into a DTPA violation have frequently invoked this provision.64
In Ken Petroleum Corp. v. Questor Drilling Corp.,65 the Texas Supreme
Court discussed the effect of a void contract on a claim under this section
of the DTPA.66 Ken is an oil and gas operator that contracted with Ques-
tor to drill a well. The contract contained mutual indemnity provisions in
which Ken agreed to indemnify Questor for injuries to Ken's employees,
and Questor agreed to indemnify Ken for injuries to Questor's employ-
ees. The parties agreed to support their indemnity obligations with insur-
ance, self-insurance or a combination of the two. A Questor employee
was killed during the drilling of the well, and his survivors sued both
Questor and Ken. Ken filed a cross-claim against Questor when Questor
refused to provide indemnity. The parties settled the wrongful death suit,
and Ken and its insurance underwriters then brought a separate action
against Questor and its parent company alleging a breach of the indem-
nity agreement, breach of guaranty based on the certificate of insurance
and DTPA violations. The defendants moved for summary judgment ar-
guing that the indemnity provision was void under the 1991 version of the
Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act67 and that there was no DTPA viola-
tion as a matter of law because the claim was, in essence, a breach of
61. Id. at 756.
62. Id. at 756, 760
63. DTPA § 17.46(b)(12).
64. See, e.g., Adler Paper Stock, Inc. v. Houston Refuse Disposal, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 761,
764-65 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Hometown Real Estate Co., 890 S.W.2d 118, 125 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ de-
nied); Garrison Contractors, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1996), affd, 966 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1998).
65. 24 S.W.3d 344 (Tex. 2000).
66. This case was actually two consolidated cases-Ken Petroleum Corp. v. Questor
Drilling Corp., 976 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. granted), and Weber
Energy Corp v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 976 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1998, pet. granted). As the DTPA issues arose only in the Ken Petroleum case, only that
case is discussed here.
67. The current version is located at sections 127.001-007 of the TEXAS CIVIL PRAC-
TICE AND REMEDIES CODE (Vernon 1997 and Supp. 2000).
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contract claim and because there was no intentional misrepresentation. 68
The trial court granted summary judgment, and the Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals reversed.69
The Texas Supreme Court recognized that a simple breach of contract
generally does not give rise to a DTPA claim but that this does not auto-
matically foreclose a DTPA claim when a contract or part of a contract is
void by operation of law.70 At the same time, the court recognized that
the mere fact of a void contract does not give rise to a DTPA claim.71
Because Ken failed to present any summary judgment evidence that
Questor made any representations about the indemnity provisions, and
the indemnity provisions themselves are agreements, not representations,
summary judgment was appropriate. 72
2. § 17.46(b)(23)-Failure to Disclose
Section 17.46(b)(23) is perhaps the broadest "laundry list" provision, as
it permits a consumer to premise a DTPA claim on the allegation that the
defendant failed to disclose information to the consumer prior to con-
summation of the transaction. To maintain an action under this section, a
consumer must show that the defendant failed to disclose information
concerning goods or services, which was known at the time of the transac-
tion, and that the nondisclosure was motivated by the intent to induce the
consumer into a transaction that the consumer otherwise would not have
entered.73
The State of Texas brought suit in Rayford v. State74 under this provi-
sion against an ultrasound sonographer for using a fetal ultrasound scan-
ner for nondiagnostic purposes. The State alleged that this use violated
the Texas Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") 75 and the DTPA.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the State on
the FDCA claim.76 After a trial on the merits, the trial court held that
the sonographer had falsely advertised the device and violated the
DTPA. 77 On appeal, the State supported its DTPA claim by arguing that
the sonographer failed to disclose to the consumer that the use of the
device was not approved and required a prescription. The Dallas Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that even if those
disclosures should have been made, the State had presented no evidence
that the failure to disclose induced a consumer into a transaction she
68. Ken Petroleum, 24 S.W.3d at 356.




73. DTPA § 17.46(b)(23); see also Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907
S.W.2d 472, 479 (Tex. 1995).
74. 16 S.W.3d 203 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied).
75. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 431.001-.279 (Vernon 1992 and Supp.
2001).
76. Rayford, 16 S.W.3d at 205.
77. Id.
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would not have entered had she known the information. 78
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in
Colonial County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Valdez.79 Hector Valdez purchased a car
and arranged for car insurance from Colonial County Mutual Insurance.
A few months later, he sold the car to his son, Rene Valdez, who ar-
ranged for financing from a bank. Hector told his insurance agent to ex-
pect a call from the bank about "changes" and "arrangements" for the
insurance. The bank called the insurance agent to verify that "Mr.
Valdez" had insurance and was told that he did. Hector never told Colo-
nial or the insurance agent that he had sold the car, but Hector was never
informed that he could only insure the car if he owned it. Colonial did
not discover that Hector did not own the car until it was stolen and Hec-
tor made a claim. Colonial filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment
that Hector did not have an insurable- interest in the car. Colonial ob-
tained a summary judgment, which was reversed on appeal.80
After Colonial obtained its summary judgment but before that judg-
ment was reversed, Hector sued Colonial alleging violations of the Texas
Insurance Code and the DTPA. The jury awarded Hector damages on
both claims and Colonial appealed, arguing that the evidence was factu-
ally and legally insufficient to support the jury's findings.81 Colonial ar-
gued that a mere nondisclosure of material information was insufficient
to establish DTPA liability under section 17.46(b)(23), and the court of
appeals agreed.82 The court held that a failure to disclose is actionable
under this section only if it is accompanied by the intent to induce the
purchaser to buy.83 Since Hector did not tell the company of his inten-
tion to sell the car and there was no evidence that Colonial failed to dis-
close with the intent to induce him to enter the contract, Hector was not
entitled to recovery under section 17.46(b)(23). 84
Finally, last year's Survey reported on the case of Nwaigwe v. Pruden-
tial Property and Casualty Ins. Co.,85 in which the owner of a rent house
purchased a fire insurance policy from Prudential. The owner indicated
to the insurance agent that the house would not be vacant for more than
thirty consecutive days a year. The owner signed an insurance applica-
tion acknowledging that the coverage was subject to the policy terms, but
the owner never obtained a copy of the policy. The policy was issued and,
despite the owner's representations to the agent, the house was unoccu-
pied for several months prior to a fire, which destroyed the premises. The
insurer denied coverage based upon a clause in the policy excluding cov-
78. Id. at 210-11.
79. 30 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
80. Id. at 516-17.
81. Id. at 517.
82. Id. at 517-18.
83. Id. at 518.
84. Id. The Insurance Code claim is discussed infra Part III.B.
85. No. 04-98-0037-CV, 1999 WL 343774 (Tex. App.-San Antonio May 28, 1999, no
pet.).
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erage for a building vacant for sixty days preceding the loss. The owner
sued the insurer and agent under various theories, including a DTPA
claim based upon the defendants' alleged failure to disclose the vacancy
clause. 86
The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the DTPA claim.
In the decision reported last year, the court of appeals reversed, holding
that the summary judgment evidence failed to negate as a matter of law a
nondisclosure claim under DTPA section 17.46(b)(23). In support of this
conclusion, the court curiously opined that, in order to prove that they
disclosed the vacancy clause, the defendants must show that they had dis-
cussed it with the plaintiff or had provided it to him in writing.87 Perhaps
recognizing the bizarre consequences of its analysis-that a contacting
consumer who fails for whatever reason to obtain a copy of the parties'
contract is free to later assert a DTPA claim based upon the "nondisclo-
sure" of contract terms that operate against his interests-the court of
appeals granted the insurance company's motion for rehearing and with-
drew its prior opinion.88
In its new opinion, the court of appeals found that no specific misrepre-
sentations were made to the owner and that, to the extent knowledge of
the 60-day vacancy clause might have been material to the owner's deci-
sion to purchase the policy, "it lost its materiality when [the owner] repre-
sented to Prudential that his property would not be unoccupied for more
than thirty consecutive days per year.89 The court held that, under the
circumstances, Prudential had no duty to advise the owner of the vacancy
exclusion. 90 The court further held that a mistaken belief about the scope
or availability of insurance coverage is not actionable under the DTPA or
the Insurance Code and that Prudential was entitled to summary judg-
ment on those claims.91
3. Section 17.50-Breach of Express or Implied Warranties
Although a DTPA claim may be based upon the breach of an express
or implied warranty, the DTPA does not itself create any warranties.92
To be actionable under the DTPA, an implied warranty must be recog-
nized by the common law or created by statute.93 A DTPA plaintiff rais-
ing a breach of warranty claim therefore must show: (1) consumer status,
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing, inter alia, Parkens v. Texas Farmers Ins. Co., 645 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex.
1983)).
88. Nwaigwe v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 27 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2000, pet. denied). Last year's Survey criticized the court of appeals' "uncriti-
cal application" of § 17.46(23) on this point. See 55 SMU L. REV. 865, 875-77 (Summer
2000).
89. Nwaigwe, 27 S.W.3d at 560.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 560-61.
92. Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1995); see DTPA
§ 17.50(a)(2).
93. Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 438 (citing La Sara Grain v. First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d
558, 565 (Tex. 1984)).
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(2) existence of the warranty, (3) breach of the warranty, and (4) that the
breach was a producing cause of the plaintiff's damages.94
The Houston Court of Appeals examined this type of DTPA claim in
Johnston v. McKinney Am., Inc.95 In that case a lessor of computer equip-
ment sued the lessee under the pre-1995 version of the DTPA for past
due rental payments. The lessee, who operated a chiropractic clinic,
counterclaimed alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation
and DTPA violations and seeking rescission of the contract and a declara-
tory judgment that it was void. After a bench trial, the court entered
judgment in favor of the lessor on the past due rentals claim and entered
a take nothing judgment on the lessee's counterclaims. 96
On appeal, the lessee argued that the evidence showed as a matter of
law that the lessor had breached its implied warranty of merchantability
because the computer system was unmerchantable. The court of appeals
held that the common law implied warranty of merchantability applied to
a lease of goods. 97 The court found that the warranty was breached be-
cause the undisputed evidence showed that the computer system was de-
fective and unsuitable for the ordinary purposes for which it was used at
the time it left the lessor.98 Finally, because the breach caused damages
to the lessee, the court of appeals held that the lessee had established
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability as a matter of law. 99
B. INCORPORATION OF THE DTPA INTO THE
TEXAS INSURANCE CODE
Numerous statutes incorporate various sections of the DTPA or permit
recovery for their violation via the DTPA.100 One of the most frequently
invoked of these "borrowing" statutes is Article 21.21 of the Texas Insur-
ance Code.10 1 During the Survey period, several plaintiffs invoked this
provision to allege deceptive acts by insurers in connection with insur-
ance claims.
Hector Valdez, the plaintiff in Colonial County Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Valdez, 10 2 had better luck with his Insurance Code claim than with his
DTPA claim. Colonial County Mutual Insurance did not inform him that
94. Johnston v. McKinney Am., Inc., 9 S.W.3d 271, 282 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 275.
97. Id. at 282-83.
98. Id. at 283.
99. Id.
100. Statutes either incorporating provisions of the DTPA or permitting recovery for
their violation via the DTPA include: TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 351.604, 702.403; TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.007, 59.005, 221.024, 221.071, 222.011; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 35.74(c); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 164.013; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
21.21; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 4413(36), 5221a-7, 5221 a-8, 5221f, 9020; and TEX. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 684.086.
101. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 and Supp. 2001).




he would no longer have an insurable interest in his car if he sold the car
to his son. The jury awarded Hector damages on his Insurance Code and
DTPA claims and Colonial appealed, arguing that the evidence was factu-
ally and legally insufficient to support the jury's findings. 10 3 The court of
appeals held that Colonial's failure to disclose was not actionable under
the DTPA since there was no evidence that Colonial acted with the intent
to induce Hector to enter the contract.'0 4 Colonial argued that the same
logic should preclude an Insurance Code claim for failure to disclose, but
the court disagreed. The Insurance Code prohibits the making of any
misrepresentation relating to an insurance policy by: (1) making an un-
true statement of material fact, (2) failing to state a material fact that is
necessary to make other statements not misleading, considering the cir-
cumstances under which the statements are made, (3) making any state-
ment in such a manner as to mislead a reasonably prudent person to a
false conclusion of a material fact, (4) making a material misstatement of
law, or (5) failing to disclose the full terms of the policy.10 5 The court
found that Colonial had failed to disclose that transfer of title would void
insurance coverage and held that a statement of that material fact was
necessary to make the terms in the policy showing coverage to be effec-
tive not misleading.10 6 The court also held that Colonial's failure to dis-
close would have misled a reasonably prudent person to the false
conclusion that the car was covered after the transfer and that Colonial
had failed to disclose the full terms of the policy.'0 7 Thus, Colonial was
liable under three Insurance Code definitions.10 8
Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Cameron10 9 arose from a fire that destroyed a
residence and most of the contents. The evidence of arson was over-
whelming, and the homeowners were not present at the time of the fire
and had alibis. The homeowners made a claim under their homeowner's
insurance policy, which the insurance company denied on the grounds
that it had a "good faith belief" that the homeowners either started the
fire themselves or instructed someone else to start the fire and that the
homeowners made misrepresentations when the insurance company was
investigating the claim. The homeowners sued the insurance company for
breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and
violations of the Insurance Code and DTPA. A jury found in favor of the
homeowners and awarded damages.110
On appeal, the insurance company argued that the evidence was factu-
ally insufficient to support the jury's verdict. The Dallas Court of Ap-
peals examined the evidence and found that there was no evidence
103. Id. at 517.
104. Id. at 517-18.
105. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(11)(a) - (e) (Vernon 1981 and Supp. 2001).
106. Colonial Country Mut., 30 S.W.3d at 521.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 24 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied).
110. Id. at 391.
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implicating the homeowners in the fire, that they had not removed their
valuable or sentimental property from the home prior to the fire, that
payment of the policy limits would represent a net financial loss, that the
adjuster failed to investigate discrepancies in the inventory lists prepared
and that the insurer had failed to interview the homeowners' alibi wit-
nesses."1 The court held that this evidence was sufficient to support the
jury's finding that the insurance company breached its duty of good faith
and fair dealing, engaged in an unfair claims settlement practice, and ac-
ted knowingly or intentionally in violation of the DTPA and Insurance
Code. 112
C. UNCONSCIONABILITY
DTPA §17.45(5) defines an "unconscionable action or course of ac-
tion" as "an act or practice which, to a consumer's detriment, takes ad-
vantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of the
consumer to a grossly unfair degree."" 3 In Johnston v. McKinney Am.,
Inc.," 4 discussed above, the lessor under a computer assignment lease
sued the lessee under the pre-1995 version of the DTPA for past due
rental payments. The lessee, who operated a chiropractic clinic, counter-
claimed alleging, inter alia, DTPA violations. The lessee presented evi-
dence at a bench trial that, despite making $24,171.30 in rental payments,
it received no benefit from the equipment and, in fact, lost $33,376 in
insurance claims. The lessee also presented evidence that it paid $2,000
to two computer experts in attempts to repair the equipment but was
informed that it could not be fixed. The trial court nevertheless entered
judgment in favor of the lessor for the past due rental payment and en-
tered a take nothing judgment against the lessee on his counterclaims,
and the lessee appealed. 115
The Houston Court of Appeals explained that under the applicable
version of the DTPA, an unconscionable action was defined as an act or
practice that "results in a gross disparity between the value received and
consideration paid, in a transaction involving transfer of considera-
tion."" 6 Economic loss alone may support recovery on this type of un-
conscionability, and a plaintiff may maintain a DTPA unconscionability
claim even if the seller made no specific misrepresentation.' 17 The court
of appeals found that the evidence established gross-disparity unconscio-
111. Id. at 396.
112. Id.
113. DTPA § 17.45(5). Prior to the 1995 amendments, the definition also included an
act or practice that "results in a gross disparity between the value received and considera-
tion paid, in a transaction involving transfer of consideration." TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon 1987).
114. 9 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). See supra notes
95-99 and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 275, 279.
116. Id. at 278.




nability as a matter of law." 8
The San Antonio Court of Appeals considered unconsionability allega-
tions against insurance agents in Reyna v. Safeway Managing Gen.
Agency for State and County Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,119 which arose from an
automobile accident and the ensuing litigation. The case began as a de-
claratory judgment action by one of the automobile liability insurers. Nu-
merous subsequently-added claims and cross-claims among various
parties were settled and the parties were realigned with the insured as
plaintiff, the insurer as third-party plaintiff, the injured parties as inter-
venors and the insurance agents as defendants. The insured alleged that
he had been harmed in the underlying litigation by the agents' failure to
forward certain papers to the insurer. A jury trial resulted in a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, insurer and injured on claims of breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty and violations of the DTPA and Insurance Code.
The agents appealed, arguing that their actions had not been
unconscionable. 120
The court of appeals affirmed.121 The court first reviewed the evidence
presented, which showed that in addition to failing to forward the legal
papers, the agents had altered documents and files in an attempt to show
that they had forwarded the papers. 122 The agents also assured the in-
sured that the legal papers had been sent. The court held that this series
of actions could have been found by the jury to have the tendency to
deceive an ordinary person and that the jury could have found that the
agents took advantage of the insured's lack of knowledge, amounting to
unconscionable conduct. 123
IV. DETERMINING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A prevailing plaintiff in a DTPA action may recover economic dam-
ages.' 24 If the trier of fact finds that the defendant acted "knowingly,"
the plaintiff also may recover damages for mental anguish and additional
statutory damages up to three times the amount of economic damages.125
A. ACTUAL DAMAGES
The plaintiff in Checker Bag Co. v. Lee Washington126 was a manufac-
turer and seller of pre-packaged cotton candy. In early 1996, a problem
developed with the candy's shelf life. The plaintiff blamed the problems
on the packaging and sued the bag manufacturer for DTPA violations
and breach of contract. The evidence at trial indicated that the plaintiff
118. Id. at 279.
119. 27 S.W.3d 7 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.).
120. Id. at 14-15.
121. Id. at 23-24.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. DTPA § 17.50(b)(1).
125. Id.
126. 27 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied).
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had to change the bags used for the cotton candy several times for various
reasons. Finally, Checker Bag recommended a particular bag and repre-
sented that it would provide a certain level of moisture protection. Be-
cause of the shelf-life problem, the plaintiff lost customers including a
contract to sell his cotton candy to some Blockbuster Video stores. The
jury found that Checker Bag violated the DTPA and breached its con-
tract with the plaintiff and awarded damages.127
Checker Bag appealed arguing that the jury's award of damages for
both lost profits and injury to business reputation constituted an imper-
missible double recovery.128 The Waco Court of Appeals determined
that recovery for both lost profits and injury to business reputation may
be duplicative but is not necessarily So. 1 2 9 The court then held that the
plaintiff's recovery was not necessarily duplicative since the plaintiff had
divided his damages into two separate markets-Blockbuster Video cus-
tomers and all other customers. 130
The defendant home sellers in Blackstock v. Dudley,131 who were ac-
cused of failing to disclose severe plumbing problems in connection with
the sale of their home, appealed a jury verdict against them and the trial
court's calculation of damages. The court awarded the buyers the differ-
ence between the value of the home at the time of the sale and the price
paid for it, as well as their reasonable and necessary out-of-pocket ex-
penses. The Amarillo Court of Appeals modified the damages award,
observing that successful DTPA plaintiffs may elect to receive either out-
of-pocket damages or benefit of the bargain damages, because to receive
both would amount to a prohibited double recovery. 132 When repair
costs are involved, the plaintiff may recover damages for repair costs and
post-repair diminution in value but may not recover repair costs when the
diminution in value is calculated pre-repair.1 33 Applying the law to the
facts before it, the court held that the jury question inquired about the
difference in value between the house when it was purchased and the
price paid for it-a pre-repair diminution in value-and that allowing the
home buyers to recover both the diminution and the repair costs would
amount to a double recovery.134
B. MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES
Several courts examined the evidence required to recover mental
anguish damages under the DTPA. In Colonial County Mut. Ins. Co. v.
127. Id. at 630-33.
128. Id. at 641.
129. Id.
130. Id. The court also held that although the jury was not instructed to avoid including
any amount for lost profits in its award for damage to business reputation, Checker Bag
had waived any argument regarding the jury charge. Id. at 641-42.
131. 12 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
132. Id. at 135 (citing Bankston Nissan, Inc. v. Walters, 754 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex.
1988)).
133. Id. (citing Ludt v. McCollum, 762 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1988)).
134. Id. at 135-36.
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Valdez,135 discussed above, the plaintiff alleged that Colonial failed to in-
form him that he would no longer have an insurable interest in his car if
he sold it to his son. The jury awarded damages on Insurance Code and
DTPA claims and Colonial appealed, arguing in part that the evidence
was insufficient to support the jury's award of mental anguish dam-
ages.1 36 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that an award of dam-
ages for mental anguish is appropriate where there is direct evidence of
the nature, duration and severity of the plaintiff's anguish which estab-
lishes a substantial disruption in the person's daily routine. 137 The court
held that the plaintiff's testimony that he felt deceived, "very mad," and
powerless and that this affected his health in the form of high blood pres-
sure and sleeping disorders was sufficient to support the jury's award.138
The San Antonio Court of Appeals considered the evidence of mental
anguish necessary to survive a "no evidence" summary judgment in Gon-
zalez v. Temple-Inland Mortgage Corp., also discussed above. 139 The
court of appeals held that a plaintiff seeking mental anguish damages
must offer evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of any mental
anguish sufficient to show a substantial disruption of the plaintiff's daily
routine.140 The court held that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs-
that their daily routine was substantially disrupted as a result of "mental
sensations of painful emotions, in the forms of grief, indignation, stress,
fear, loss of sleep, depression and duress"-was too conclusory to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether they could recover mental
anguish damages.14'
The San Antonio Court of Appeals also considered mental anguish
damages in Reyna v. Safeway Managing Gen. Agency for State and
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co.142 As discussed above, 143 Reyna arose from an
automobile accident and the ensuing litigation. After the personal injury
suit was concluded, the insured alleged that he had been harmed in that
litigation by the insurance agents' failure to forward certain papers to the
insurer. A jury trial resulted in the plaintiff's favor. 144
Affirming, the court of appeals examined the plaintiff's testimony that
as a result of the underlying proceedings he was concerned for his credit
and avoided making purchases, and he was concerned that he could be
forced into bankruptcy or that his wages would be garnished, leaving him
without the funds necessary to pay his child support and thus subject to
135. 30 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.). See supra notes 78-83
and 101-103 and accompanying text.
136. Id. at 525.
137. Id. at 526.
138. Id.
139. 28 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.). See supra notes 51-54 and
accompanying text.
140. Id. at 326.
141. Id.
142. 27 S.W.3d 7 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.).
143. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
144. Id. at 23.
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incarceration. He was also concerned that his job was in jeopardy. The
San Antonio court concluded that taken together this evidence was le-
gally sufficient to support the jury's award of $25,000 for mental
anguish. 145
As discussed above, the plaintiffs in Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Cam-
eron146 were accused by their homeowners insurer of being involved in
starting a fire that destroyed their residence and most of its contents. 147
On appeal from a judgment in the plaintiffs' favor, the insurance com-
pany argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's award
of damages for mental anguish. The husband's only testimony about his
mental state was that he "felt bad" when the insurer accused him of being
an arsonist because the insurer was saying that he was "some type of
criminal" and that it made him mad that the insurer persisted in accusing
him of arson. The court of appeals held that this evidence was legally
insufficient to support the jury's award of damages for mental anguish. 148
The wife, on the other hand, testified that she was "terrified" at the accu-
sation, took time off from work, walked the floor at night and could not
sleep, and took prescription medication for her insomnia. She further
testified that she had dramatically reduced her participation in church ac-
tivities. The court held that this evidence was legally and factually suffi-
cient to support the jury's finding that the wife had suffered compensable
mental anguish. 149
V. DTPA DEFENSES AND EXEMPTIONS
The DTPA has been characterized as a "strict liability" statute, requir-
ing only proof of a misrepresentation without regard to the offending
party's intent.150 This is only partially correct, since several DTPA provi-
sions expressly require proof of intentional conduct. 151 Some courts have
gone so far as to hold that common law defenses, such as estoppel and
ratification, are not available to combat DTPA claims.152 Other courts
145. Id.
146. 24 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied). See supra notes 109-12 and
accompanying text.
147. Id. at 391.
148. Id. at 394-95.
149. Id. at 396-97; see also Burleson State Bank v. Plunkett, 27 S.W.3d 605, 617-18 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied) (supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text) (holding that
testimony that the plaintiff construction contractor was unable to sleep, and suffered from
headaches, diarrhea, vomiting and depression, that this had affected his work and thus, he
had not been able to build houses was sufficient to support jury's award of $10,000 in
damages); Blackstock v. Dudley, 12 S.W.3d 131, 138 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.)
(supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text) (holding that under the 1986 version of the
DTPA, it was appropriate to apply prejudgment interest to mental anguish damages that
had accrued as of the time the petition was filed).
150. See, e.g., White Budd Van Ness P'ship v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture, 798
S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd).
151. See, e.g., DTPA § 17.46(b)(9), (10), (13), (16), (17) & (23).
152. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 928 S.W.2d 133, 154 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1996), affid in part, rev'd in part, 981 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. 1998); see also Smith v.
Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) (recognizing that a primary purpose of the DTPA
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have recognized a variety of defenses to DTPA claims. 153 Additionally,
both the courts and the legislature have carved out exemptions from the
DTPA's reach.
A. THE DTPA's ExCLUSION FOR MOST PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
The 1995 amendments to the DTPA limited the ability of a plaintiff to
bring a DTPA claim arising from professional services. 154 Section
17.49(c) provides that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall apply to a claim
for damages based on the rendering of a professional service, the essence
of which is the providing of advice, judgment, opinion, or similar profes-
sional skill." The exemption does not apply to an express misrepresenta-
tion of a material fact that cannot be characterized as advice, judgment or
opinion. 155
The first reported case to apply this amendment was Cole v. Central
Valley Chemicals, Inc.156 The Coles purchased a herbicide after the defen-
dant's salesman told them that it would provide better weed control and
cost less than the herbicides the plaintiffs had used in the past. When the
herbicide failed to control the weeds, leading to a reduced corn yield and
monetary loss, the plaintiffs sued for negligent misrepresentation and
DTPA violations. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment holding, in part, that the plaintiffs' claims were pre-
cluded by the DTPA's exclusion of professional services, and the plain-
tiffs appealed. 157
The court of appeals reversed. 158 The defendant had argued that the
exclusion applied because the Coles sought professional advice from the
salesman, who was an agronomist. The Coles countered that they went to
the defendant's business seeking an herbicide, not professional advice.
The Coles argued that the logical result of construing the salesman's rec-
ommendation as a professional service would be to preclude DTPA
claims whenever the consumer purchases a product based upon a sales-
man's advice. The court of appeals agreed, holding that the Coles' claim
was based upon the purchase of the herbicide, not on the rendering of a
professional service. 159
was to relieve consumers of common law defenses while providing a cause of action for
misrepresentation).
153. See, e.g., Ostrow v. United Bus. Machs., Inc., 982 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) ("We hold a DTPA claim arising out of a contract may be
barred by accord and satisfaction."); Johnson v. McLeaish, No. 05-94-01673-CV, 1995 WL
500308, at *10 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 23, 1995, writ denied) (applying illegality/public
policy affirmative defense to DTPA claims); Keriotis v. Lombardo Rental Trust, 607
S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e) (applying statute of frauds to
DTPA claims).
154. See DTPA § 17.49(c).
155. Id. at § 17.49(c)(1).
156. 9 S.W.3d 207 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).




B. A "MERE" BREACH OF CONTRACT iS NOT ACTIONABLE
UNDER THE DTPA
A breach of contract unaccompanied by a misrepresentation or fraud is
not a false, misleading or deceptive act and thus does not violate the
DTPA. 160 During the Survey period, several cases examined this limita-
tion on the DTPA's reach. The plaintiff in Riddick v. Quail Harbor Con-
dominium Ass'n 16 1 purchased a condominium from the defendant. By
the terms of the Condominium Declaration, which controlled the opera-
tions of the condominium association, the plaintiff owned only the inner
finished surfaces and the interior walls, floors, ceilings, doors and win-
dows. The plaintiff was responsible for repairs and maintenance of the
interior. The foundation, roof, exterior of the unit and ground under the
unit were designated as "common elements" and were jointly owned by
all of the owners of the units. Only the association was authorized to
perform maintenance and repairs on the common elements. Shifting soil
caused the foundation to move, which caused cracks in the interior and
exterior walls of the plaintiff's unit. The association hired an engineering
firm, which stabilized the foundation. The plaintiff alleged that the asso-
ciation's failure to repair the cracked walls and interior damage violated
the DTPA and was a breach of contract.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the condominium
association on the DTPA claim and the Houston Court of Appeals af-
firmed.162 The court held that the plaintiff's failure to bring forward any
evidence of a misrepresentation or other "false, misleading or deceptive
acts" was fatal to the DTPA claim.163
The plaintiff in Frost Nat'l Bank v. Heafner164 sued her bank for al-
lowing $10,000 to be withdrawn from her account pursuant to forged
checks. She alleged that the bank was liable for negligence, spoliation of
evidence, breach of the duty of good faith, breach of contract and a viola-
tion of the DTPA. After a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the bank
appealed, arguing that the DTPA allegation was nothing more than a
breach of contract claim.165 The plaintiff contended that the claims were
different because her breach of contract claim alleged that the bank
breached the deposit account agreement by paying the forged checks and
160. E.g., Ashford Dev., Inc. v. USLife Real Estate Serv. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935
(Tex. 1983); Quitta v. Fossati, 808 S.W.2d 636, 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ
denied).
161. 7 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
162. Id. at 669-71.
163. Id. at 670-71. Curiously, the court of appeals held that the absence of evidence of
a misrepresentation and the fact that the plaintiff's claim was one for breach of contract
only, meant that the trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiff was not a consumer.
Id. See also Ken Petroleum Corp. v. Questor Drilling Corp., 24 S.W.3d 344 (Tex. 2000)
(supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text) (holding a DTPA claim might arise from a void
contract but the mere fact that a contract was void did not establish an actionable
misrepresentation).
164. 12 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst. Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
165. Id. at 111.
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by not following its error resolution procedure, while the basis of her
DTPA claim was that the bank misrepresented the safety and security of
deposited funds, safeguards to prevent unauthorized withdrawals and the
attributes of the services it offered. She also argued that the bank mis-
represented her right to share in the results of its investigation into the
forgeries. The Houston Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment and reversed, holding that the plaintiff's assertions amounted to
nothing more than a complaint that the bank did not comply with the
terms of the deposit account agreement. 166
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered claims arising from a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale of a home in Key v. Pierce.167 The homeown-
ers executed a deed of trust in favor of a mortgage company and then
defaulted on their obligation. At the mortgage company's request, the
substitute trustee posted the property for nonjudicial foreclosure. The
notice stated that the property would be sold to the highest bidder. When
the plaintiff, who was the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, tendered
his payment, he was told that he could not buy the property after all be-
cause the homeowners had declared bankruptcy. 168 The next day, the
substitute trustee discovered that the homeowners had not, in fact, de-
clared bankruptcy. He reposted the property but the mortgage company
was the highest bidder at the second sale.
The plaintiff brought suit against the mortgage company, the substitute
trustee, the substitute trustee's employer and the employer's parent com-
pany and the couple who purchased the property from the mortgage com-
pany, seeking a declaratory judgment awarding him title to the property.
The plaintiff also sought a constructive trust based on fraud and uncon-
scionable conduct and damages for misrepresentation and DTPA viola-
tions. The DTPA claims were premised on the argument that the
defendants misrepresented that they would perform under the posted no-
tice. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff
on his claim for a declaratory judgment but against the plaintiff on his
other claims. 169 The court of appeals affirmed holding, as to the DTPA
claim, that the plaintiff's injury was actionable under contract law and not
the DTPA because it was the nonperformance, not the statements, that
caused the harm. 170
166. Id. at 111-12; see also Dickey v. Club Corp. of Am., 12 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2000, pet. denied) (holding that country club members' purported DTPA claim was
nothing more than a complaint about the club's ability to make and enforce rules gov-
erning use of the golf course, and thus was merely a breach of contract claim not actionable
under the DTPA).
167. 8 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
168. The substitute trustee's employer told him that the homeowners had declared
bankruptcy.
169. 8 S.W.3d at 707.
170. Id. at 709-10.
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C. PREEMPTION AND EXEMPTION FROM THE DTPA
Several statutory schemes and common law doctrines bar DTPA claims
either expressly or by implication or affect a plaintiff's procedures for
bringing DTPA claims. During the Survey period, several cases ex-
amined these limitations on the DTPA's reach.
1. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA")
regulates the content and format of labeling for herbicides and requires
that all herbicides be registered with the Environmental Protection
Agency. 171 FIFRA preempts common law tort suits that are based solely
upon claims relating to labeling.172 As discussed above, the plaintiffs in
Cole v. Cent. Valley Chems., Inc.173 purchased a herbicide from the defen-
dant after the salesman told them that the herbicide would provide better
weed control and cost less than the herbicides the plaintiffs had used in
the past. When the herbicide failed to control the weeds, leading to a
reduced corn yield and monetary loss, the plaintiffs sued for negligent
misrepresentation and DTPA violations. The trial court granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment holding, in part, that the plain-
tiffs' claims were preempted by FIFRA. i74
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that their claims were not based on the
herbicide's label or its failure to warn but on the failure of the product to
perform in accordance with the salesman's representations. The San
Antonio Court of Appeals examined the plaintiffs' petition and found
that the plaintiffs' claims arose from the salesman's representations. The
court held that because the plaintiffs' claims were not related directly or
indirectly to labeling, FIFRA did not preempt them.175
2. Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code
The Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code 176 was enacted to govern
the distribution and sale of motor vehicles through licensing and regulat-
ing vehicle manufacturers, distributors and dealers. 177 The Code pro-
vides that the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission ("TMVC") shall carry
out the duties and functions conferred upon it by the Code. If the TMVC
determines that the Code, or any TMVC rule or order, has been violated,
it may levy a civil penalty, issue cease and desist orders or injunctions or
institute a lawsuit in the name of the State of Texas,178 but it may not
171. E.g., Quest Chem. Corp. v. Elam, 898 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Tex. 1995).
172. Id.
173. 9 S.W.3d 207 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). See supra notes 156-59
and accompanying text.
174. Id. at 209-10.
175. Id.
176. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 2001).
177. E.g., David McDavid Nissan, Inc. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 56, 64 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1999), rev'd, _ S.W.3d _; 44 Tex. Sup. C. J. 779 (Tex. 2001).
178. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.01-.03 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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award damages to parties. 179 The Dallas Court of Appeals examined the
relationship between the Code and the DTPA in David McDavid Nissan,
Inc. v. Subaru of Am., Inc.180 McDavid, an automobile dealership, sued
Subaru alleging that Subaru orally consented to the dealership's reloca-
tion and then refused to allow the relocation. McDavid terminated its
Subaru dealership agreement and sued under various theories including
the Code and the DTPA. Subaru moved for summary judgment on the
ground that McDavid was barred from bringing its claims because it
failed to raise those claims before the TMVC.181
Section 6.06(a) of the Code provides that a person who has sustained
actual damages as a result of a violation of the Code may maintain an
action:
pursuant to the terms of [the DTPA] and shall be entitled to all pro-
cedures and remedies provided for therein. In any action brought
under [section 6.06(a)] ... a judgment rendered pursuant to [section
6.06(a)] shall pay due deference to the findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law of the [TMVC] contained in a final order which forms
the basis of the action. 182
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that section 6.06(a) evinced a legisla-
tive intent that the TMVC have primary jurisdiction to determine
whether the Code was violated before a party may bring a DTPA action
in court for damages resulting from the violation.183 Thus, the court held
that McDavid was required to present its Code/DTPA claims to the
TMVC and obtain findings that Subaru violated the Code before bringing
its DTPA claims in court. 184 The court then rendered judgment, dis-
missing McDavid's DTPA claim for lack of jurisdiction. 185
In a decision issued outside the Survey period, the Texas Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the TMVC had primary jurisdiction, not ex-
clusive jurisdiction over McDavid's DTPA claims and that the trial court
should have abated its proceeding rather than dismissing for lack of juris-
diction.186 This opinion will be fully discussed in next year's Survey.
179. See Kawasaki Motors Corp. USA v. Tex. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 855 S.W.2d 792,
797 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
180. 10 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999), rev'd __ S.W.3d -, 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
779 (Tex. 2001).
181. At the time of the events giving rise to McDavid's claims, the Code provided that
the TMVC was vested with the "general and original power and jurisdiction to regulate all
aspects of the distribution and sale of new motor vehicles" and that "all aspects of the
distribution and sale of motor vehicles" were governed "exclusively" by the provisions of
the Code. Id. at 64-65.
182. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
183. 10 S.W.3d at 68-69.
184. Id. at 69.
185. Id.
186. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., _ S.W.3d __, 44 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 779 (Tex. 2001).
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3. The Carmack Amendment
The Carmack Amendment governs a motor carrier's liability to a ship-
per, consignor, holder of bill of lading or buyer for the loss of, or damage
to, an interstate shipment of goods. 187 The Amendment subjects the mo-
tor carrier to absolute liability for "actual loss or injury to property. ' 188
If a transaction is governed by the Amendment, state statutory and com-
mon law claims involving the transaction are preempted.' 89 The plaintiff
in Tallyho Plastics, Inc. v. Big M Constr. Co.190 sued a construction com-
pany and a trucking company and its driver under various theories includ-
ing the DTPA for damage its plastic injection molding machine received
when the truck hauling the machine from Nebraska to Texas was involved
in an accident. The construction company was hired to install the ma-
chine when it arrived in Texas. During the negotiations, the parties dis-
cussed the transportation of the machine. The construction company
contacted a broker and an agreement was reached that the shipping com-
pany would transport the machine. Reversing the trial court's judgment
in favor of the plaintiff on its statutory and common law causes of action,
the Tyler Court of Appeals held that the construction company was acting
as a broker, as that term is defined in the Carmack Amendment, and that
the plaintiff's state statutory and common law causes of action therefore
were preempted. 191
4. The "Learned Intermediary Doctrine"
The "learned intermediary doctrine" is one peculiar to cases involving
a medical product manufacturer's duty to warn. 192 Under Texas' inter-
pretation of this doctrine, "when a drug manufacturer properly warns a
prescribing physician of the dangerous propensities of its product, the
manufacturer is excused from warning each patient who receives the
drug. The doctor stands as a learned intermediary between the manufac-
turer and the ultimate consumer."'1 93 The physician's knowledge of the
warning operates to protect the manufacturer and serves to shift to the
physician the duty of explaining risks to the consumer unless the warning
provided to the physician is inadequate or misleading. 194 If a warning
was given but was defective, the plaintiff may recover by proving that the
failure to warn was a producing cause of the plaintiff's injury. 195
The plaintiff in Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co. v. Medrano 96 offered several
187. 49 U.S.C. § 13101 et seq. (Supp. IV 1994).
188. See Mo. Pacific R.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 137 (1964).
189. Accura Sys., Inc. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1996).
190. 8 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1999, no pet.).
191. Id. at 793.
192. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1999).
193. Aim v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Tex. 1986) (citations
omitted).
194. Id. at 592.
195. See Stewart v. Janssen Pharmaceutical, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1989, writ denied).
196. 28 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
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theories why the learned intermediary doctrine should not apply to her
product liability claims. First, she argued that the doctrine should not
apply to claims involving prescription contraceptives because the patient
makes the decision as to which contraceptive she will use and the inter-
mediary merely abides by that decision. The Texarkana Court of Appeals
rejected this argument, holding that the doctrine applies even when a
physician makes no independent judgment in prescribing and administer-
ing the prescription drug.197 The court held that this result was just be-
cause the prescription drug can reach the patient only by way of a learned
intermediary. 198 The plaintiff next argued that the doctrine should not
apply because she was counseled by an advanced practice nurse who
worked for her gynecologist. The court held that since Texas law permits
advanced practice nurses to prescribe medication and treat patients with-
out the supervision of a physician, they qualify as learned in-
termediaries. 199 Finally, the plaintiff argued that the doctrine should not
apply to her DTPA claims because it is a common law defense. The court
recognized that common law defenses may not be applied to bar DTPA
claims,200 but it held that the learned intermediary doctrine "is used to
show to whom a defendant, usually a prescription drug manufacturer,
owes the duty to adequately warn," and that even when the doctrine ap-
plies, the manufacturer still has a duty to warn and can be held liable to
the patient if the warning it gave was inadequate. 20' Because assertion of
the doctrine does not by itself indicate that the plaintiff has no case, the
court held that it is not properly characterized as a "defense" and thus
applies to DTPA claims. 202 Turning to the plaintiff's claim, the court held
that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict based upon the
nurse's testimony that the additional warnings the plaintiff thought were
lacking would not have affected her decision to prescribe the contracep-
tive to the plaintiff.20 3
D. "As Is" CLAUSES
An "as is" agreement generally negates the causation element of a
DTPA claim.204 The plaintiffs in Fletcher v. Edwards20 5 entered into a
contract to purchase a lot which obligated them to accept the property
"in its present condition." The plaintiffs contended that the real estate
agent told them that water service to the property had been disconnected
197. Id. at 92.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 93.
200. Id. at 94.
201. Wyeth-Ayerst, 28 S.W.3d at 94.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 95. See also Dyer v. Danek Med., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740-42 (N.D.
Tex. 2000) (applying the learned intermediary doctrine to the plaintiffs' claim of failure to
warn arising from a spinal fixation device).
204. E.g., Fletcher v. Edwards, 26 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied)
(citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161-62 (Tex. 1995)).
205. 26 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied).
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but could be reestablished. At the closing, the plaintiffs signed an "Ac-
ceptance of Title" that contained an "as is" clause. When the plaintiffs
discovered that water service was not available to the property, they sued
the real estate agent, his employer and other defendants for statutory and
common law fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation and
DTPA violations. 20 6 The defendants filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, alleging, in part, that the "as is" clauses in the original contract and
the Acceptance of Title barred the plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs ar-
gued that "as is" clauses do not apply in DTPA suits, but the trial court
granted the motion.20 7
On appeal, the plaintiffs failed to raise their argument that "as is"
clauses do not apply to DTPA suits so the Waco Court of Appeals limited
its review to whether the clauses were legally sufficient to entitle the de-
fendants to summary judgment.208 The court first acknowledged that
while an "as is" agreement generally negates the causation element of a
DTPA claim, such an agreement does not bind a buyer who is fraudu-
lently induced into entering the agreement unless the agreement ex-
presses the parties' intent to waive fraudulent inducement claims or
disclaims reliance on the particular representations in dispute.209 Be-
cause the plaintiffs alleged that the real estate agent made misrepresenta-
tions to induce them to enter into the real estate contract and because
when the plaintiffs entered into the agreements they were not attempting
to resolve the instant dispute, were not represented by counsel, and were
not "sophisticated business players," the court held that the agreements
did not establish the defendants' entitlement to summary judgment as a
matter of law. 210 If followed, such casuistic reasoning would lend to the
abrogation of the "as is" defense to DTPA claims.
E. CAUSATION
Liability under the DTPA is limited to actions that are a producing
cause of the plaintiff's damages.211 Unlike the doctrine of proximate
cause, producing cause does not require that the injury be foreseeable. 212
"Producing cause" has been defined as "an efficient, exciting, or contrib-
uting cause, which in a natural sequence, produced injuries or damages
complained of."213 When determining whether the actions complained of
are the producing cause of a plaintiff's damages, courts look to whether
the alleged cause is a substantial factor that brings about the plaintiff's
206. The plaintiffs subsequently nonsuited their claims against all defendants other than
the real estate agent and his employer. Id. at 72.
207. Id. at 73.
208. Id. at 75.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 76-77 (distinguishing Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171
(Tex. 1997)).
211. Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995).
212. E.g., Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruck, 690 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ
dism'd).
213. Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995).
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injury, without which the injury would not have occurred. 214
The causal connection between the alleged wrong and the plaintiff's
injury must not be broken by an intervening or superseding cause. 215
Proof that a new and independent basis exists for the plaintiff's injuries
may negate a claim that the defendant's actions were a producing cause
of those injuries.216 During the Survey period, two cases examined the
concept of intervening or superseding cause. Blackstock v. Dudley217
arose from the sale of a home with allegedly undisclosed severe plumbing
problems. The buyers sued the sellers and the real estate agent claiming
various DTPA violations during the sale process. The jury found that the
sellers had engaged in false, misleading or deceptive acts and awarded
damages to the buyers and the sellers appealed arguing, in part, that the
buyers' reliance upon a professional home inspection was a "new and
independent basis" for the purchase that superseded the allegedly wrong-
ful acts as a matter of law. The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected this
argument because the inspection did not, and could not have, uncovered
the plumbing problem and the buyers had no knowledge of the defects.218
The plaintiff in Bartlett v. Schmidt2 19 sued the sellers of real estate,
their broker, and two title companies alleging that the defendants were
aware that he intended to use the property for commercial purposes and
yet failed to inform him that the property was restricted for residential
use. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor
of the plaintiff against the broker, holding that even if the broker's state-
ment that there were no restrictions on the property was a cause of the
plaintiff's damage, the plaintiff's decision to execute an earnest money
contract and his review of the title commitment were "new and indepen-
dent" causes of his injuries.220
The San Antonio Court of Appeals applied the concept of producing
cause in Maclntire v. Armed Forces Benefit Ass'n,221 in which a benefici-
ary under a lapsed insurance policy nevertheless sought payment of the
benefits and sued the insurer when the insurer denied her request. Af-
firming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the insurer, the
San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the producing cause of the pol-
icy's lapse was the insureds' failure to pay the premiums and that the
insurer's alleged billing errors were not a substantial factor especially in
214. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex.
1995).
215. E.g., Dubow v. Dragon, 746 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 1998, no pet.).
216. Id.
217. 12 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.). See supra notes 131-34 and
accompanying text.
218. Id. at 133-34; see also Fernandez v Schultz, 15 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000,
no pet.) (holding that reliance on a professional inspection report does not relieve a house
seller of liability for misrepresentations about termite infestation when the misrepresenta-
tions are one of several producing causes).
219. 33 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. filed).
220. Id. at 40.
221. 27 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.). See supra notes 55-59 and
accompanying text.
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the absence of any evidence that the beneficiary was misled by the al-
leged errors.222
The plaintiff in Hou-Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics223 was an oil and
gas company that drilled a dry hole after its geological contractor used
software called SeisVision to help choose the drilling site. A bug in Seis-
Vision caused a miscalculation that resulted in the hole being drilled hun-
dreds of feet from the site where it should have been drilled. The
contractor reported the bug to the owner and licensor of SeisVision and
was told that the owner had known about the bug for almost a year and
had corrected the bug in a newer version of the software but had not sent
the newer version to all of its clients. The oil and gas company sued Seis-
Vision's owner for the costs of drilling the dry hole and asserted claims of
negligence, breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation and viola-
tions of the DTPA. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the software owner.224
The oil and gas company appealed, and the software owner argued that
the DTPA does not impose vicarious liability on a defendant based on an
innocent involvement in a business transaction. The court of appeals first
recognized that DTPA liability will not be imposed merely because a de-
fendant introduced a product into the stream of commerce. 225 "The
DTPA is not intended to reach upstream manufacturers when their mis-
representations are not communicated to the consumer. 2 26 The court
construed the summary judgment evidence as showing a deceptive act on
the part of the software owner but held, without using the term "causa-
tion," that to avoid summary judgment there must be some evidence that
someone communicated the deception to the oil and gas company. Be-
cause the oil and gas company offered no evidence to controvert the
software owner's evidence that it had no communication with the com-
pany and because there was no evidence that the oil and gas company
even knew about the defect until the software failed, the court affirmed
the summary judgment.227
As discussed above, the plaintiff in Checker Bag Co. v. Lee Washing-
ton22 8 was a manufacturer and seller of pre-packaged cotton candy. In
early 1996, a problem developed with the shelf-life of the candy. The
plaintiff first closely examined and monitored his production equipment
222. Id. at 92-93.
223. 26 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
224. Id. at 106.
225. Id. at 111 (citing Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex.
1996)).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 111-12; see also Dagley v. Haag Eng'g Co., 18 S.W.3d 787, 791-92 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding that engineering firm hired by an in-
surer was not liable to the insureds for the insurer's allegedly wrongful denial of the in-
sureds' claims absent evidence that any alleged misrepresentation were made to insureds
and absent evidence of a special relationship between the engineering company and
insureds).
228. 27 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied). See supra notes 126-30 and
accompanying text.
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and facility, and he then conducted interviews to determine if the candy
had been properly stored. Finally, he switched bags and the shelf-life
problems ceased.
The jury found that the manufacturer had violated the DTPA and
breached its contract with the plaintiff.229 The manufacturer appealed
arguing, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support
the jury's finding that its misrepresentation about the quality of the bags
was a producing cause of the plaintiff's injury. 230 The Waco Court of Ap-
peals determined that there was some evidence from which the jury could
find that the decreased shelf-life was the result of the lower moisture bar-
rier provided by the bags and that the plaintiff would not have purchased
those bags absent the manufacturer's representations about their quality
and characteristics. 23'
The plaintiffs in Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins232 were farmers who pur-
chased sorghum seed from the defendants. They claimed to have relied
upon the defendants' promotional literature stating that the seed had
"excellent dryland yield potential." When two years' crops suffered from
reduced yield, the plaintiffs sued alleging that the defendants had
breached express and implied warranties, committed fraud and violated
the DTPA. A jury found for the plaintiffs on their warranty and DTPA
claims and the defendants appealed, arguing that the evidence was
neither legally nor factually sufficient to support the plaintiffs' claims.233
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that testimony by the plaintiffs'
expert that the particular sorghum seed was not suitable for dry land
farming constituted sufficient evidence in support of the jury's verdict as
to causation. 234
F. WAIVER
The DTPA specifically limits the circumstances in which parties can
effectively waive the statute's protections.235 A waiver is void as contrary
to public policy unless it is in conspicuous bold-face type and identified as
a waiver, and the consumer has signed the waiver and was represented by
counsel in seeking or acquiring the goods or services at issue.236
In Johnston v. McKinney Am., Inc.,237 a computer lessor sued the
lessee for past due rental payments. The lessee, who operated a chiro-
practic clinic, counterclaimed alleging breach of contract, negligent mis-
representation and violations of the DTPA and seeking rescission of the
229. Id. at 630.
230. Id. at 635.
231. Id. at 636.
232. 18 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000), affd, 47 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. 2001).
See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
233. Id. at 748.
234. Id. at 755.
235. DTPA § 17.42(a)-(e).
236. Id. at (a), (c).
237. 9 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). See supra notes
95-99 and 114-18 and accompanying text.
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contract and a declaratory judgment that the contract was void. After a
bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the lessor on the
past due rentals claim and entered a take nothing judgment on the
lessee's counterclaims. 238
On appeal, the lessee argued that the lessor breached its implied war-
ranty of merchantability because the computer system was not merchant-
able. The lease agreement contained a disclaimer of warranty, but the
lessee argued that the disclaimer was void as a matter of law under sec-
tion 17.42 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. 239 The Houston
Court of Appeals held that the disclaimer complied with section 2.316 of
the Business and Commerce Code and thus did not offend the "no
waiver" provision of the DTPA.240
G. LIMITATIONS
Under the DTPA's limitations provision, an action must be com-
menced within two years after the date on which the false, misleading or
deceptive act or practice occurred, or within two years after the consumer
discovered, or should have discovered, the occurrence of the false, mis-
leading or deceptive act or practice. 241
Two decisions during the Survey period examined the effect of the exis-
tence of public records on the DTPA limitations provision. The Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, examined the issue in Lopez v.
Martin.242 The plaintiff intervenor Lopez operated a trucking business
from his home and needed appropriately-zoned property for parking his
trucks. He located a property and contracted the listed real estate agent.
Lopez's brother and sister-in-law purchased the property for his benefit.
As part of the process of obtaining a loan, they were required to have the
property appraised. The appraisal indicated that the property had full
utilities. Three years after the sale closed, Lopez attempted to obtain
electrical power for the property but the utility company refused because
it determined that the property was unplatted.
Asserting that without electricity the property could not be improved
as planned, Lopez and his brother and sister-in-law sued the appraiser
and the real estate agency, its owner and its employee alleging negli-
gence, gross negligence, statutory and common law fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, spoliation of evidence and DTPA violations.243 The jury found that
the defendants had violated the DTPA and held them liable for negligent
238. Id. at 275.
239. Section 17.42 provides that a waiver of the DTPA's protections is contrary to pub-
lic policy and is unenforceable unless the waiver is in writing and is signed by the con-
sumer, the consumer is not in a significantly disparate bargaining position and the
consumer is represented by a lawyer in seeking or acquiring the goods or services. DTPA
§ 17.42.
240. Johnston, 9 S.W.3d at 280 (citing Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FDP Corp., 811
S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex. 1991)).
241. DTPA § 17.565.
242. 10 S.W.3d 790 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied).
243. Id. at 791.
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misrepresentation, negligence and statutory and common law fraud.244
The jury also found, however, that the plaintiffs had been in possession of
sufficient information to discover the wrongful acts more than two years
before filing suit, which resulted in a take-nothing judgement because
limitations barred the suit.24 5
Lopez appealed, arguing in part that the evidence was insufficient to
support the finding that more than two years prior to filing suit he had
been in possession of sufficient facts to cause an ordinarily prudent per-
son to investigate whether the property had the utilities necessary to sup-
port his intentions for the property. The court of appeals held that the
evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's
findings. The court first explained that the discovery rule requires a party
to "exercise reasonable care and diligence to discover facts, conditions, or
circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to make an inquiry
leading to the discovery of the injury. '246 Because the Corpus Christi
platting ordinance and the local government code prohibit the connection
of utilities to unplatted land, the court explained that the plaintiffs'
awareness of sufficient facts to lead to further inquiry about the effect of
the platting ordinance would tend to show adequate notice.247
The court then examined the evidence presented at trial. The record
reflected that none of the closing documents described the property as
platted or gave a legal description of the property by referring to a plat
and that one of the closing officers of the title company testified that she
had advised one of the plaintiffs that the property was not listed in the
plat records. One of the closing documents stated "if the property is not
platted, I have been informed that I should seek advice of my attorney to
determine if there would be any difficulty improving the property. ' 248
One of plaintiff's contemporaneously-made handwritten notes indicated
a need to call officials in the City Planning Office to discuss "platting."
The court held that this evidence was sufficient to establish possession,
more than two years prior to filing suit, of sufficient facts to cause a per-
son of reasonable prudence to conduct further investigation into whether
the property was platted and whether there would be difficulty connect-
ing utilities to the property.249
Three judges dissented. 250 The dissent found that even if the plaintiffs
were informed at the closing that the land was unplatted, there was no
evidence that they should have been aware of the significance of unplat-
ted land with regard to utilities.251 The dissent cited further testimony
from the closing agent acknowledging that she had no independent recol-
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 792.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 793-94.
250. Id. at 795-98.
251. Id. at 795.
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lection of the transaction but merely indicated that it was her "proce-
dure" to tell a buyer whether the property was described in "field notes"
and not filed for record.252 The dissent believed that neither these refer-
ences nor the fact that the closing documents suggested contacting an
attorney regarding improvements to the property demonstrated that the
plaintiffs should have known that the property was unplatted, let alone
that they should have inquired about a lack of utilities.253 The dissent
would have reversed the jury's findings because the "overwhelming
weight and preponderance of the evidence" showed that the plaintiffs did
not know, and should not have known, of the property's lack of utilities
until they sought to put a security light on the property and were in-
formed, first by the power company and then by the city planning depart-
ment, that the property had no utilities.254
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that public deed records do
not always give rise to constructive notice in Salinas v. Gary Pools, Inc. 255
Homeowners filed suit against a swimming pool contractor that installed
their pool on a public easement. The suit was filed more than ten years
after the pool was installed but less than two years after the homeowners
discovered the problem. The trial court granted the contractor's motion
for summary judgment on the defense of limitations and the homeowners
appealed. 256 The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded,257 holding that the doctrine of constructive notice of real prop-
erty records does not apply to constitute notice to plaintiffs alleging
DTPA violations.258 Because the homeowners produced summary judg-
ment evidence showing that they were not aware of the easement and did
not discover that their pool was constructed on the easement, the court
held that the contractor had failed to negate application of the discovery
rule and summary judgment was inappropriate.25 9 The court observed,
however, that a fact issue remained regarding whether the homeowners
had exercised due diligence in discovering the alleged DTPA violation.260
Kanon v. Methodist Hosp.261 arose from alleged problems with a medi-
cal device called a Proplast implant, which is used to relieve temporo-
mandibular joint problems. A woman who had received a Proplast
252. Id. at 796-97.
253. Lopez, 10 S.W.3d at 796-97. The dissent also argued that the majority opinion
overstated the evidence with respect to the sister-in-law's handwritten notes. According to
the dissent, the only evidence presented was that the notes were made during the process
of purchasing the property and not at the closing and that the notes did not indicate a need
to call city officials regarding platting but merely twice contained the name of the city
planner and the city planning office's telephone number-once next to the phrase "1-2
Light Industrial" and once next to the single word "plated" [sic]. Id. at 797.
254. Id. at 798.
255. 31 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
256. Id. at 334-35.
257. Id. at 335.
258. Id. at 337 (citing Lightfoot v. Weissgarber, 763 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1989, writ denied)).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 9 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
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implant and her husband sued various defendants involved with the im-
plant including Methodist Hospital. The hospital moved for summary
judgment on limitations grounds, arguing that the wife was aware of the
problem with the Proplast implant more than two years prior to filing
suit. The plaintiffs argued that while they knew of the problems with the
implant more than two years prior to filing suit, limitations had not run
because, due to a variety of misrepresentations, their discovery of the
hospital's involvement in the manufacturing, development and sale of the
implant had come less than two years prior to filing suit. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, and the Houston
Court of Appeals affirmed. 262 The court held that limitations begins to
run on a DTPA claim when the plaintiff discovers an injury and its gen-
eral cause, not the exact cause in fact and the specific parties responsi-
ble.263 Thus, even if the plaintiffs did not discover the hospital's
involvement until later, upon discovery of the injury they were under a
duty to undertake further investigation to discover the nature of the dam-
age and the parties responsible. 264
In Pecan Valley Nut Co., Inc. v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.,265 the
owners of commercial pecan orchards sued a fungicide manufacturer and
its distributors for damages to their pecan trees caused by the fungicide.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on limitations grounds be-
cause the plaintiffs had last applied the fungicide to their orchards more
than two years prior to filing suit. The trial court granted the motion and
the Eastland Court of Appeals reversed in part.266 The court held that a
DTPA cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew, or should have
known, of the "wrongfully caused injury. ' 267 In other words, accrual is
tolled until the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, "the injury
and that it was likely caused by the wrongful acts of another. '268 The
court held that the defendants failed to carry their burden of conclusively
establishing that the plaintiffs' causes of action accrued more than two
years before suit was filed.269 Although the plaintiffs were aware more
than two years prior to filing suit that something was wrong with their
pecan trees, they presented evidence that they did not know that there
was a problem with the fungicide and that the symptoms commonly re-
sulted from natural causes and therefore were not suggestive of an injury
caused by the fungicide. Summary judgment in favor of the defendants
was thus improper.2 70
262. Id. at 367.
263. Id. at 370 (citing Bayou Bend Towers Council of Co-Owners v. Manhattan Const.
Co., 866 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied)).
264. Id. at 370-71.
265. 15 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. granted).
266. Id. at 246.
267. Id. at 247 (citing KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988
S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. 1999)).




VI. AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES TO DEFENDANT
Section 17.50(c) of the DTPA provides that a defendant is entitled to
recover its attorneys' fees incurred in defending against a DTPA claim if
the claim is groundless or brought in bad faith or for purposes of harass-
ment.271 Under section 17.50(c), "groundless" means a claim having no
basis in law or fact, and not warranted by any good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.272 In determining
whether a claim is groundless, a court should determine "whether the
totality of the tendered evidence demonstrates an arguable basis in fact
and law for the consumer's claim. '273 A suit is brought in bad faith if it is
motivated by a malicious or discriminatory purpose.2 74 Whether a suit is
groundless or brought in bad faith is a question of law. 275
The Houston Court of Appeals examined this provision in Riddick v.
Quail Harbor Condominium Ass'n.276 As noted above, the plaintiff pur-
chased a condominium from the defendant and sued when shifting soil
under the slab foundation of the condominium caused the foundation to
move, causing cracks in the interior and exterior walls of the plaintiff's
unit, which the condominium association did not repair. The plaintiff
contended that he had consumer status by virtue of his payment of main-
tenance fees. The trial court granted partial summary judgment on the
plaintiff's DTPA claim because the plaintiff presented no evidence of
misrepresentations and because the plaintiff offered no evidence to refute
the defendant's evidence that the claim was barred by limitations. Find-
ing the plaintiff's DTPA claim to have been brought in violation of sec-
tion 17.50(c), the trial court awarded the defendant $22,558.80 in
attorneys' fees. 277 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that there was no evi-
dence that his DTPA claim was groundless and brought in bad faith.
The Houston Court of Appeals reversed. The plaintiff had acknowl-
edged in his brief that no Texas cases existed holding that a condominium
owner's payment of maintenance fees to a condominium association was
sufficient to be a "purchase" for DTPA purposes. The plaintiff argued
that since the issue had not been decided, his case was not groundless and
was warranted by a good faith argument for the extension, modification
or reversal of existing law. The plaintiff also argued that a specific mis-
representation was not required for a DTPA unconscionability claim and
that, despite failing to offer evidence to refute the defendant's limitations
defense, the plaintiff had made a good faith argument that limitations did
271. DTPA § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
272. Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex. 1989).
273. Splettstosser v. Myer, 779 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. 1989).
274. Central Texas Hardware, Inc. v. First City, Texas-Bryan, N.A., 810 S.W.2d 234, 237
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
275. Donwerth, 775 S.W.2d at 637.
276. 7 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). See supra notes
161-63 and accompanying text.
277. Id. at 677.
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not bar his claim due to the defendant's continuing reassurances that re-
pairs were in progress.
The court of appeals agreed. First, the court held that the plaintiff
"made a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law concerning the open question of his consumer status, and
his DTPA action was not groundless, nor brought in bad faith for these
reasons. '278 The court then held that the possibility that a DTPA uncon-
scionability claim could exist absent a misrepresentation and that a "con-
tinuing misrepresentation" could extend limitations prevented the
plaintiff's action from being groundless even though the plaintiff did not
prevail on either argument. 279
VII. CONCLUSION
This year's crop of DTPA cases, like last year's, contains relatively few
disputes involving "garden variety" consumer goods. Of the 36 appellate
decisions selected for this year's survey, only four involved products pur-
chased by consumers; of those, two involved swimming pools and two
involved medical products. The real estate and insurance industries again
were well represented, with eight and seven decisions respectively, and
various other services accounted for another six opinions. Contract dis-
putes and goods purchased for commercial purposes rather than for per-
sonal, family or household use accounted for the balance of the cases
examined in this year's review. In application, the DTPA evidently has
evolved from a consumer protection law into a business torts statute prin-
cipally employed by commercial plaintiffs. Only in the real estate and
insurance areas does the DTPA continue to have a meaningful consumer
nexus, at least as reflected in the reported decisions.280
Several themes identified in last year's survey continue to receive at-
tention from the courts. Decisions such as Hou-Tex,281 Dagley282 and
Bartlett 83 confirm that causation and privity are areas of DTPA jurispru-
dence that would benefit from further doctrinal clarification. Such cases
may be viewed as part of a broader judicial movement to ascertain the
proper boundaries of the DTPA. Five decisions discussed in this survey
involved efforts by plaintiffs to transform what were essentially contract
disputes into DTPA violations.2 84 Several others attempted to clarify
278. Id. at 678.
279. Id. at 678-69.
280. As suggested in last year's survey, this may in part be explained by the fact that
traditional consumer transactions are less likely to involve either novel legal issues or large
monetary amounts and thus are less likely than disputes involving business consumers to
receive appellate attention. See 53 SMU L. REV. 865, 896 (Summer 2000).
281. Hou-Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics, 26 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. App-San Antonio 2000,
no pet.).
282. Dagley v. Haug Eng'g Co., 18 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000,
no pet.).
283. Bartlett v. Schmidt, 33 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. App-Corpus'Christi 2000, pet. filed).
284. See Dickey v. Club Corp. of Am., 12 S.W. 3d 172 (Tex. App-Dallas 2000, pet.
denied); Ken Petroleum Corp. v. Questor Drilling Corp., 24 S.W. 3d 344 (Tex. 2000); Frost
1304 [Vol. 54
when mental anguish damages are recoverable in a DTPA case-with re-
sults difficult to reconcile. 285
Finally, the Wyeth 28 6 court grappled with an issue that has long con-
founded efforts to rationalize the DTPA's original mission of leveling the
playing field between consumers and merchants with the statute's use in
purely commercial disputes. Like the erroneous notion that intent is
never an element of a DTPA claim,287 the bald assertion often found in
the case law that common law defenses are unavailable in DTPA claims is
overdue for critical examination. Eliding an opportunity to explore the
boundaries of this proposition, the Wyeth court instead purported to dis-
tinguish between a legal principle that defeats the plaintiff's claim and
one that indicates "that the plaintiff has no case. '288 Whatever this dis-
tinction may mean, such sophistics are poor substitutes for a critical ex-
amination of whether, in light of the parties' relationship and reasonable
expectations, recognition of particular offensive and defensive theories
would promote the DTPA's original policy of protecting consumers
against those with overweening bargaining power, or would serve as a
bludgeon in commercial disputes between otherwise evenly matched and
sophisticated businesspersons.
Nat'l Bank v. Heafner, 12 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999 pet. denied);
Riddick v. Quail Harbor Condominium, Ass'n 7 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
285. Compare Colonial County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 30 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); Gonzalez v. Temple-Inland Mtg. Corp., 28 S.W.3d 622 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet. h.); Reyna v. Safeway Managing General Agency for
State and County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 27 S.W.3d 7 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet.
granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.).
286. See Wyeth-Arherst Labs., Co. v. Medrano, 28 S.W. 3d 87 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2000, no pet.).
287. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
288. See Wyeth, 28 S.W.3d at 94.
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